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CASE DIGEST
This CASE DIGEST provides brief analyses of cases that represent current aspects of transnational law. The Digest includes cases that establish legal principles and cases that apply established legal principles to
new factual situations. The cases are grouped in topical categories and
references are given for further research.
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CRIMINAL LAW
GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION TO THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE EXTENDS

TO FOREIGN CRIMINAL

INVESTIGATIONS

NARCOTICS AUTHORITIES REASONABLY
ENFORCEMENT

OFFICERS'

WHERE UNITED

REPRESENTATIONS

PLIED WITH THE FOREIGN COUNTRY'S

STATES

RELIED ON FOREIGN LAW
THAT SEARCH

COM-

LAW-United States v. Peter-

son, 812 F.2d 486 (9th Cir. 1987).
The Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) notified Philippine narcotics
authorities of a plan to smuggle thirty-two tons of marijuana from Thailand through the Philippine Islands to the United States. In response to
notification, the Philippine authorities commenced electronic surveillance
of an apartment in Manila occupied by one of the defendants and provided the DEA with tapes of telephone conversations intercepted with a
wiretap. The DEA sought and received assurances from high ranking
Philippine law enforcement officials that all necessary authorization for
the wiretaps was being obtained, but, in fact, no judicial authorization
was sought or received. On the basis of information in one of the tapes,
the DEA engaged the United States Coast Guard to intercept a ship, the
Pacific Star, off the coast of Panama. After the DEA obtained Panamanian authorization, the Coast Guard ship Citrus intercepted the Pacific
Star, boarded the ship and seized marijuana that the crew was attempting to destroy.
At trial, defendants were convicted for possession of a controlled sub-
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stance in United States customs waters with intent to distribute and for
conspiracy to destroy goods to prevent seizure, in violation of 18 U.S.c.
§ 2 (1982), 21 U.S.C. § 955a(c) (1982) and 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 2232
(1982). The court of appeals affirmed the convictions, holding inter alia
that the seized marijuana and other evidence was properly admitted over
the defendants' fourth amendment objection to the Philippine wiretap.
The court held that the fourth amendment applied to the search because
the participation of the United States agents was so substantial that the
action was a "joint venture," but that Philippine law governed whether
the search was reasonable. Applying Philippine law the court found the
wiretap was unlawful and thus was an unreasonable search under the
fourth amendment. Applying United States law to decide whether the
illegally obtained evidence should be excluded, the court admitted the
illegally obtained evidence under the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule announced in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
The court noted that the good faith exception is based on the premise
that the exclusionary rule does not function as a deterrent when law
enforcement officers act on a reasonable belief that their conduct was
legal. The court reasoned that the same premise applies to reasonable
reliance on foreign law enforcement officers' representations that there
has been compliance with their own law. In addition to Leon, which
dealt with reliance on a facially valid search warrant, the court relied on
Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981 (1984), which held that the
officers could rely on a magistrate's representations that all necessary
changes to the form of the warrant would be made. The court concluded
that permitting reasonable reliance on foreign law enforcement officers'
representations about their compliance with foreign law is a rational accommodation to the exigencies of foreign investigations. Signifcance-This decision extends the exclusionary rule's good faith exception to foreign searches conducted as part of a joint criminal investigation
between the United States and a foreign government. United States law
enforcement officers may reasonably rely on foreign law enforcement officers' representations that the foreign search complied with the foreign
country's law.

II.

FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT
ASSETS

OF A WHOLLY-OWNED

FOREIGN INSTRUMENTALITY

ARE

NOT SUBJECT TO ATTACHMENT TO SATISFY JUDGMENT AGAINST A
FOREIGN STATE UNLESS PLAINTIFF OVERCOMES PRESUMPTION OF IN-

STATUS-Hercaire Int'l, Inc. v. Argentina, 821 F.2d 559
(11th Cir. 1987).
Hercaire International, Inc., a Florida corporation, sued the Republic
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of Argentina for breach of contract arising out of ongoing business relations. Hercaire alleged Argentina failed to pay for aircraft parts it contracted for during the Falklands War. Argentina filed a counterclaim
alleging that Hercaire breached a settlement agreement in a related matter. In this litigation, Argentina expressly waived sovereign immunity for
itself and its agencies. The district court entered a directed verdict in
favor of a portion of Hercaire's claims and subsequently ordered United
States marshals to seize a Boeing 727 aircraft owned by Aerolineas Argentinas (Aerolineas) after it landed at Miami International Airport to
satisfy judgment against Argentina. Aerolineas posted a cash bond equal
to twice the judgment amount to regain possession of its aircraft and
appealed. The district court issued an Order Denying Release of Substitute Security and found that Aerolineas implicitly waived sovereign immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act. 28 U.S.C. §§
1610(a)(1), 1610(b)(1) (1982). In addition, any presumption of Aerolineas' separate juridical existence was overcome by the fact that Argentina
owned 100% of Aerolineas' stock.
Aerolineas appealed the trial court's ruling and claimed that the assets
of a foreign state's wholly-owned national airlines are not subject to execution to satisfy judgment obtained against the foreign state where the
airline was neither a party to the litigation nor connected with the underlying dispute. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the directed verdict against Argentina, but vacated the Order Denying Release
of Substitute Security issued against Aerolineas. The court of appeals
held the assets of Aerolineas were not subject to execution to satisfy the
judgment against Argentina because Aerolineas enjoyed a separate juridical existence as an instrumentality of Argentina and the express waiver
of sovereign immunity by Argentina and its agencies did not operate as a
waiver of Aerolineas' immunity. The court of appeals concluded that
Aerolineas qualified as an instrumentality with a separate juridical existence and not as an agency based on the criteria set out by the Supreme
Court in FirstNational City Bank v. Banco ParaEl Comercio Exterior
de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611 (1983) (Bancec). In Bancec the Supreme Court
stated that a government instrumentality is typically established as a separate economic enterprise with powers to hold and sell property, to sue
and be sued, to be primarily responsible for its own finances, and often
not to be subject to the same budgetary and personnel requirements as a
government agency. Accordingly, United States courts presume the assets
and liabilities of an instrumentality are separate and distinct from those
of its sovereign unless the presumption is overcome with proof that the
sovereign controls the instrumentality to the extent that a principal and
agent relation exists or proof that equity demands that recognition of the
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corporate entity would work a fraud or injustice. The court of appeals
concluded that Hercaire failed to overcome the presumption that Aerolineas was not an instrumentality by proving either of the Bancec exceptions; therefore, the court vacated the Order Denying Release of Substitute Security of Aerolineas for the judgment against Argentina.
Significance-This decision applies to a different fact situation standards
announced by the Supreme Court in Bancec to distinguish a government
agency from an independent government instrumentality that enjoys a
separate juridical status.
III.

SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT HAS SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION OVER MEXICAN CONSULAR OFFICIALS FOR THEIR ALLEGED ATTEMPTS TO SUPPRESS CRITICAL DEMONSTRATIONS OUTSIDE MEXICAN
CONSULATE IN UNITED STATES BECAUSE SUCH ACTS FALL OUTSIDE
OF CONSULAR FUNCTION IMMUNITY GRANTED BY VIENNA CONVEN-

TION

ON

CONSULAR

RELATIONs-Gerristen

v. De La Madrid

Hurtado, 819 F.2d 1511 (9th Cir. 1987).
Jack Gerristen filed a complaint pro se against the President of Mexico, the Mexican Consulate, several consular officials, and employees of
the Mexican government. In that complaint Gerristen alleged that consular officials and employees assaulted him while he attempted to distribute leaflets critical of the Mexican government in front of its Los
Angeles consulate. Gerristen asserted subject matter jurisdiction existed
under 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1982), which confers jurisdiction over actions
under color of state law that violate civil rights. The Mexican government filed a motion to dismiss on behalf of the defendants and asserted
lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The district court granted this motion
holding that the acts by the Mexican government, including the Mexican
consulate, cannot constitute conduct under color of state law as required
by 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3).
On appeal the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded
holding that subject matter jurisdiction exists over the alleged actions of
the Mexican consul generals and the vice consuls under 28 U.S.C. §
1351 (1982) and the Mexican consulate under 28 U.S.C. § 1330 (1982).
In sustaining jurisdiction the court of appeals examined the facts of the
entire complaint notwithstanding its sole assertion that the statutory basis for subject matter jurisdiction existed under 28 U.S.C. § 1343. Moreover, the court of appeals assumed Gerristen's allegations were true for
purposes of appeal. Viewing the complaint in this light, the court of
appeals stated that 28 U.S.C. § 1351 grants the district court original
jurisdiction over all civil actions and proceedings against consuls and vice
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consuls of foreign states unless a treaty has limited that jurisdiction.
Upon examination of the applicable treaty in this case, the court concluded that it did not limit jurisdiction over the Mexican officials' alleged
actions. See Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, April 24, 1963,
21 U.S.T. 77, T.I.A.S. No. 6820, 596 U.N.T.S. 261 (the "Convention").
Article 43 of the Convention states that consular officials and employees
shall not be amenable to the jurisdiction of the courts of the receiving
state with respect to acts performed in the exercise of consular functions
to actions "within the limits permitted by international law . . . [and]

not prohibited by the laws and regulations of the receiving State." 21
U.S.T. at 82-85. The court of appeals interpreted the terms "within the
limits permitted by international law" to prohibit interference with the
internal affairs of the receiving state. The court of appeals characterized
the alleged actions of the Mexican officials as "[w]rongful acts committed
• . . within the United States to suppress criticism of Mexico within this
country [which] constitute[d] an interference with the United States' internal affairs because these actions impair the citizenry's ability to promote self-government through robust discourse concerning issues of public import." Because the alleged actions fell outside the scope of
international law, they also fell outside the scope of the article 5(a) consular functions grant of immunity.
The court of appeals stated that jurisdiction over the Mexican Consulate exists under 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1602-11 (1982),
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, because the alleged acts of the
consulate fall within the tortious acts exception to the FSIA's general
grant of sovereign immunity. While § 1605(a)(5) of the FSIA grants
immunity to "discretionary acts," the acts attributed to the Mexican
Consulate in the complaint "including assault with a deadly weapon and
kidnapping, are not decisions to 'establish governmental policy,' or decisions at the 'planning level, but

. .

.

are acts to 'carry out policy', or acts

at the 'operational level'" which are amenable to federal subject matter
jurisdiction. Significance-This decision clarifies the scope of the consular functions immunity granted by the Vienna Convention on Consular
Immunity. Assuming the allegations of the original complaint were true,
the actions of the Mexican officials fell outside the limits permitted by
international law and thus were not consular functions as defined in article 5(a).
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TAXATION

VIRGIN ISLANDS TAXPAYERS MAY TAKE ONLY

A DEDUCTION AND

NOT A FOREIGN TAX CREDIT FOR TAXES PAID TO A STATE IN THE
UNITED

STATES-Johnson v. Quinn, 821 F.2d 212 (3rd Cir. 1987).

Rupert and Ada Johnson, United States citizens residing in the Virgin
Islands, filed a joint income tax return in the Virgin Islands for their
worldwide income for 1978. In that return the taxpayers claimed a foreign tax credit for income taxes paid to the State of California; however,
the Virgin Islands Tax Commissioner allowed the taxpayers to treat the
California state taxes as an itemized deduction only and not as a foreign
tax credit. The taxpayers filed a petition for redetermination in the district court as to the foreign tax credit issue, but the district court agreed
with the Commissioner's ruling based on the mirror tax system theory
and on Treasury Regulations § 1.901-1(g)(5).Johnson v. Quinn, 589 F.
Supp. 810 (D.V.I. 1984). Under the mirror tax system the Virgin Islands uses the United States income tax laws as its own by substituting
"Virgin Islands" for "United States" within the law whenever appropriate. See Vitco v. Government of Virgin Islands, 560 F.2d 180 (3d Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 980 (1978).
On appeal, the taxpayers argued that under the mirror tax system the
foreign tax credit provided by IRC § 901, 26 U.S.C. § 901 (1982), applied equally to their California state taxes as it would to taxes paid to a
foreign country by a United States stateside taxpayer. The taxpayers
claimed both situations reach the goal of avoiding double taxation. The
Third Circuit Court of Appeals, however, affirmed the lower court and
held the taxpayers were not entitled to the foreign tax credit for taxes
paid to California, but were limited to a deduction only. The court of
appeals cited two grounds supporting its decision. First, the court of appeals applied the equality principle modification of the strict mirror rule,
which states the Virgin Islands must collect the equivalent to what the
United States would collect on the same income. See Chicago Bridge and
Iron Co. v. Whealty, 430 F.2d 973 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401
U.S. 910 (1971). Thus, the equality principle limits the Virgin Islands
taxpayers to the same deduction available to a United States stateside
taxpayer. Second, Treasury Regulation § 1.901-1(g)(5) expressly disallows any foreign tax credit to inhabitants of the Virgin Islands. Significance-The court of appeals applied to a new fact situation the equality
principle originally adopted in Chicago Bridge.
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SUBSEQUENT TO ENACTMENT OF THE IMMIGRATION REFORM AND
CONTROL ACT OF

1986,

THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS

NOT APPLY TO ILLEGAL ALIENS-Patel

ACT

DOES

v. Sumani Corp., 660 F.

Supp. 1528 (N.D. Ala. 1987).
An illegal alien sued his former, employer under § 216 of the Fair
Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. (1978), seeking to
recover alleged unpaid minimum wages, unpaid overtime compensation
and an additional equal amount as liquidated damages. The employer
denied the allegations and also asserted that the FLSA does not protect
the rights of illegal aliens. The district court agreed with the employer,
finding that the alien employee was not an "individual" as defined in the
FLSA and therefore had no standing to assert a claim under the FLSA.
The court assumed arguendo that the employee had standing, but found
that illegal aliens had no right to recover under the FLSA, because their
inclusion would conflict with the policy of the Immigration Reform and
Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359. The
court noted that by passing the IRCA, Congress intended to discourage
illegal immigration by imposing criminal and civil sanctions against employees who hired illegal aliens. Court enforcement of the FLSA wage
standards for illegal aliens would once again encourage illegal immigration and thus frustrate the purpose of the IRCA. At-the same time the
IRCA provides eligibility for legalization as the exclusive protection
mechanism for aliens who can demonstrate that they have lived in the
United States prior to January 1, 1982. Thus, former aliens who qualify
for legalization would enjoy FLSA protection as United States citizens,
but those aliens who do not qualify for legalization under the IRCA of
1986 receive no FLSA protection. Significance-This decision establishes a minority view, following enactment of the IRCA of 1986, that
illegal aliens no longer enjoy protection under the FLSA.

